Florida State University College of Law

Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
2014

Reflections on Home Concrete
Steve R. Johnson
Florida State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steve R. Johnson, Reflections on Home Concrete, 13 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 77 (2014),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/244

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

78

FSU BUSINESS REVIEW

[Vol. 13

Lantz,5 Mayo, s Dominion Resources,7 and Loving. s
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC9 is the Supreme
Court's most recent foray into the thicket of the validity of
Treasury tax regulations. The decision disappointed some because
the Court avoided many significant issues raised by commentators
or briefed by the par ties.10
Nonetheless, Home Concrete gives us much to digest. 11 Some
reactions to the decision appear below. They are grouped under
four headings: (1) litigation balance between the government and
taxpayers, (2) retroactivity, (3) deference doctrine, and (4)
statutory interpretation. These considerations are developed below
after a brief description of the Home Concrete decision.

II.

H OME CONCRETE

Home Concrete arose out of a long-running controversy. When
the IRS believes that a taxpayer's return understates true tax
liability, the IRS ordinarily must assess the additional liabilities
within three years after the return was filed (or, if later, three
years after the return was due to be filed). 12 A number of
exceptions to this general rule exist, however. One of the
exceptions allows the IRS a six-year assessment period when the
return "omits from gross income an amount properly includible
therein [which] is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income stated in the return."13
The six-year rule obviously applies when the tax
understatement results from complete omission of taxable receipts
of sufficient amount. Does the six-year rule also apply when the
Swallows as It Is: The Distortion of National Muffler, TAX NOTES, July 24, 2006, at 351
(2006) [hereinafter Swallows l].
4. Mannella v. Comm'r, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011), revg 132 T.C. 131 (2009).
5. Lantz v. Comm'r, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), rev'g 132 T.C. 131 (2009).
6. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (20ll). See, e.g. ,
Steve R. Johnson, Mayo and the Future of Tax Regulations, TAX NOTF.S, Mar. 28, 2011, at 1547.
7. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
8. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), affd, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
2014). For discussion of Loving, see Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS
Regulation of Tax Return Preparation, 60 VILLANOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
9. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
10. E.g., Patrick J. Smith, What We Didn't Learn from Home Concrete, TAX NOTES, June
25, 2012, at 1625. See generally Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 227 (1984) ("In cases ... where
the effective and expeditious enforcement of our [n]ation's tax laws is at issue, what we do not
decide is as important as what we do decide.'~
11. For discussion of the decision generally, see Steve R. Johnson, After the Cheering,
Problems, 31 ABA SEC. OF TAX'N NEWS Q. 1 (2012); William J. Wilkins, Implications of Home
Concrete, 31 ABA SEC. OF TAX'N NEWS Q. 25 (2012); Shamik Trivedi & Jeremiah Coder,
Wilkins, Butler Give Their Takes on Home Concrete, TAX NOTES, May 21, 2012, at 974.
12. I.R.C. § 650l(a) (2010).
13. I.RC. § 650l(e)(l)(A) (2010).
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shelter contexts.
However, this benefit may evanesce. If Treasury and the IRS
decide that the stakes are sufficiently high, they could ask
Congress to amend section 6501(e) to adopt the position rejected in
Home Concrete.
Accordingly, more significant than Home Concrete's particular
outcome may be the signal that it sends as to the future of tax
litigation. Home Concrete adds to a positive trend that has been
building in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 2011 Mayo
decision. 24 There are two principal types of tax regulations: specific
authority25 and general authority26 regulations. In Mayo, the Court
unanimously held that, no less than specific authority regulations,
general authority tax regulations are tested under the Chevron
stan dard when their validity is challenged.27
Mayo inspired widespread concern in the taxpayer and
taxpayer representatives community that the balance in litigation
between taxpayers and the government had been dramatically
tilted in favor of the government. This concern arose for two
related reasons. First, Mayo dispensed with National Muffler as
the guiding case when general authority regulations are
challenged, and many considered Chevron more deferential to the
government than National Muffler. 28 Second, Mayo disregarded a
number of considerations listed in National Muffler, considerations
on which taxpayers had staked their arguments in many prior
cases. These included whether the IRS's current position is
consistent with its prior positions, whether the IRS's
interpretation is of long standing, whether the IRS took the
position essentially contemporaneously with the enactment of the
applicable IRS section, and whether the regulation at issue is a
"fighting regulation," one promulgated in anticipation of litigation
in order to bolster the government's prospects in that litigation. 29
24. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
For discussion of Mayo, see Joana Que, Note, The State of Treasury Regulatory Authority
After Mayo Foundation: Arguing for an Intentionalist Approach at Chevron Step One, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1413 (2012); Sebastian Watt, Note, Abolishing the Shelter Ambiguity: A New
Framework for Treasury Regulation Deference Clarifying Chevron and Brand X, 117 PENN
ST. L. REV. 617 (2012).
25. Specific authority delegations appear in hundreds of particular sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Legislative Grants
of Regulatory Authority, 2006 TNT 215-22 (Nov. 3, 2006).
26. General authority regulations derive from the blanket delegation in Code § 7805(a),
which allows Treasury to issue regulations "needful ... for the enforcement of this title ...."
27. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 465 U.S. 837 (1984).
28. See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
29. As to fighting regulations, see Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1996);
Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 115 F.3d 430, 436 (7th Cir. 1997); Leandra
Lederman, The Fight over "Fighting Reg" and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 643 (2012).
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Many of these premises were simply wrong. First, National
Muffler, properly understood, was a deferential case.30 Second,
Chevron is less deferential than some have assumed. Agency
positions have often been invalidated at Step One as contrary to an
unambiguous statute.3 1 Step Two is easier for agencies but still an
occasional source of invalidation. 32 Indeed, the current trend is
towards more exacting, less agency-friendly application of
Chevron. 33 Third, many of the specific considerations Mayo
dispensed with clearly were disfavored, even under prior case law.34
Moreover, the fears some had about Mayo have not been
confirmed by experience. Taxpayers have not fared worse in tax
litigation since Mayo was handed down than they had before
Mayo. Indeed, taxpayers have prevailed in many cases which have
cited Mayo. 35
The issue decided in Home Concrete had been controversial for
many years, and the lower courts were divided. The taxpayer had
prevailed in the circuit court below,36 and in several other cases of
the line citing Mayo. 31
The taxpayer's win in the Supreme Court in Home Concrete,
although narrow (5-4 or 4-1-4), provides additional reassurance, as
do the most recent major cases citing Mayo. These include
Dominion Resources, in which a circuit court invalidated on
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") grounds a regulation under
section 263A of the Internal Revenue Code,38 and Loving, in which
a district court invalidated on Chevron Step One grounds Treasury
regulations regulating tax return preparers. 39
30. This point is developed in Steve R. J ohnson, Preserving Fairness in. Tax
Administration in. the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX. REV. 269, 286·87 (2012).
31. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decision.making in Reviewing Agency Interpretatwn of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 94-95 (1994).
32. E.g., Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1317-19 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Goldenstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
33. See Linda Jell um, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence,
59 ADMlN L. REV. 725, 781 (2007) ("Those judges and scholars who viewed Chevron as an
agency-friendly decision have been proved wrong'~; Johnson, supra note 8, at pt. II.B.l.
34. For a detailed discussion of the ·'agency inconsistency" consideration, see Johnson,
supra note 8, at pt. II.B.3.c.
35. E.g., Estate of Petter v. Comm'r, 653 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011); Cohen v.
United States, 650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 103 Fed. Cl. 111 (2012); Pullins v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 432 (2011).
36. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C. v. United States, 634 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2010).
37. E.g., Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Carpenter Family Invs.,
LLC v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 373 (2011). Of course, there were cases on the other side as well.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit spli t.
38. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012). For discussion
of the APA as applied to tax, sec David J. Shakow, Who's Afraid of the APA?, TAX NOTES.
Feb. 14, 2012, at 825; Rimma Tsvasman. Note, No More Excuses: A Case for the JRS's Full
Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 837 (2011).
39. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013).
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In short, the Court's decision in Home Concrete is yet another
indication that fears about Mayo were exaggerated. Indeed, by
forcing taxpayers' counsel to broaden their angle of vision to
include APA arguments along with traditional arguments, Mayo
and other recent cases may actually enhance taxpayers' abilities to
challenge improper tax regulations and rulings. 40

B . Reliance
Taxpayers often challenge positional changes by Treasury or
the IRS on the ground that the changes undercut taxpayers'
reasonable reliance on the prior positions. 41 Home Concrete
provides additional support for reliance arguments.
Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment affords much of the ammunition. His opinion begins:
"It would be r easonable, I think, to deny all precedential effect to
Colony . .. to overrule it s holding as obviously contrary to our later
law that agency resolutions of ambiguities are to be accorded
deference. Because of justifiable taxpayer reliance I would not take
that course."42
Similarly, the penultimate sentence of Justice Scalia's opinion is:
"What is needed for the system to work is that Congress, the
Executive, and the private parties subject to their dispositions, be able
to predict the meaning that the courts will give to their instructions."4 3
The four justices participating in Justice Kennedy's dissenting
opinion also accepted the importance of taxpayer reliance
although, under the circumstances, they felt that Treasury's
"clarification of an ambiguous statute, applicable to these
taxpayers, did not upset legitimate settled expectations ."44
Protecting reasonable reliance is among the core "rule of law"
values. 4 5 Home Concrete supports such values in another way as
well. Throughout the progress of Home Concrete and related cases
through the courts, the government emphasized that the
taxpayers' transactions were tax shelters. This should be

40. See Steve R. J ohnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era,
32 VA. TAX R EV. 269 (2012).
41. See generally J effrey L. J owell, LAW AND BUREAUCRACY: ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ACTION 12-13 (1975) (''Those with business interests
need r eliable rules in order to achieve cer tainty and predictability in t heir oper ations.").
42. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L .L.C., 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 (Scalia, J .,
concurring). See also id. at 1847 (speaking of the "justifia ble relian ce of taxpayers").
43. Id. at 1849.
44. Id. at 1853 (Kennedy, J ., dissenting).
45. For discussion of rule -of-law considerations in tax, see Steve R. J ohnson, An IRS

Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative
Solution, 77 T ENN. L. R EV. 563, 592-93 (2010).
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irrelevant when the issue is the statute of the limitations.46 The
government's argument was, in essence, that the end justifies the
means. In ignoring this invitation to selective justice, the Court
upheld the rule of law.
C. Expertise

One of the reasons courts defer to agencies is the agencies'
superior technical expertise. However, Home Concrete reminds us
that the courts' constitutional responsibility to interpret the laws
does not admit unlimited deference, regardless of agency expertise.
The Home Concrete majority noted that the Colony Court "was
aware it was rejecting the expert opinion of the Commissioner,"47
and it reaffirmed that approach.

IV.

RETROACTIVITY

I note here one of the potentially important issues to which
Home Concrete gave less than satisfactory shrift. Among the most
interesting of the issues raised by the briefs in the case was
whether the amended section 6501(e) regulations were retroactive
and, if so, what effect that would have on their validity. Resolving
the case on the ground of stare decisis, the Home Concrete majority
did not reach these questions. 4 8
The dissent rejected the stare decisis argument, so it did engage
with retroactivity analysis, although only briefly. Finding the current
version of section 6501(e) to differ materially from the version
constructed in Colony, the dissent thought that the amended
regulations merely clarified an ambiguous statute. "Having worked
no change in the law, and instead having interpreted a statutory
provision without an established meaning, the ... regulation does not
have an impermissible retroactive effect."49
Far from satiating our appetite, this morsel makes us hungry for
hardier fare. Section 7805(b)(l) of the Internal Revenue Code
generally prohibits retroactive application of tax regulations, but
the remainder of section 7805(b) sets out exceptions and allows the
IRS to "prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ... [sub-regulation
guidance] ... shall be applied without retroactive effect."50
46. Cf Chevron, U.S.A., [nc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 465 U.S. 837, 864 (1984);
SEC V. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Loving v. ms. 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79
(D.D.C. 2013) (all holding that policy arguments are irrelevant at Chevron's Step One).
47. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844.
48. Id. at 1841.
49. Id. at 1853 (Kennedy, J ., dissenting).
50. LR. C. § 7805(b)(8) (2004).
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The issues unresolved by Home Concrete will, no doubt, be
addressed in future cases. These issues include the following: (1) What
does retroactivity mean and when is a regulation or ruling retroactive?
(2) Are the section 7805(b) exceptions so expansive that they effectively
swallow the section 7805(b)(l) prohibition of retroactive regulations?
(3) How much broader, if at all, is the opportunity for retroactive
rulings as opposed to retroactive regulations?
V.

DEFERENCE DOCTRINE

A. Chevron

A growing chorus of voices, including mine, has urged the
overthrow of Chevron. 51 That will not happen overtly, but there is
some movement in the direction of submerging Chevron into
"arbitrary and capricious" review under the APA. 52
As long as Chevron is around, however, we will have to work
with it. The famous Chevron "two step" is: whether the statute is
unambiguous, in which case deference is not accorded to the
agency's view (Step One) and, if the statute is ambiguous, whether
the agency's interpretation of it is at least reasonable, in which
case deference is afforded (Step Two).
One of the problems with Chevron is the unsatisfactory nature of
this analytical format. If the regulation in question is contrary to an
unambiguous statute, it cannot be reasonable. If it is consistent
with an unambiguous statute, it cannot be unreasonable. Thus, the
two steps merge.53 In his Home Concrete opinion, Justice Scalia
aligned himself with this view, noting that" 'Step 1' has never been
an essential part of Chevron analysis."54
If the "Step One versus Step Two" distinction is to be followed,
a recurring question is: where, if at all, is legislative history to be
considered?55 Textualist judges would prefer to avoid legislative
history entirely, as Chief Justice Roberts did in his opinion for the
Court in Mayo. 56 Purposivist judges grant legislative history
51. E.g., Johnson, supra note 30, at 280-85; Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law
out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013);
Patrick J. Smith, Chevron's Conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 VA. TAX REV.
813, 814-16 (2013).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See generally Patrick J. Smith, The APA's Arbitrary and
Capricious Standard and IRS Regulations, TAX NOTES, July 16, 2012, at 271.
53. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
54. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846 n.l (ScaUa, J., concurring).
55. See, e.g. Melinda Forte, Note, May Legislative History Be Considered at Chevron
Step One? The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Geiser, 54
VILL. L. REV. 727 (2009).
56. Briefs for the parties and amici in Mayo cited committee reports. E.g. Reply Brief for
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considerable sway, as Justice Kagan did in her op1mon for the
Court in a non-tax case Judulang v. Holder. 57 If legislative history
is to be taken into account, does it bear on Step One or Step Two?
The majority opinion in Home Concrete was penned by Justice
Breyer, a committed purposivist. In a portion of the opinion that
was for a plurality only (because Justice Scalia did not subscribe to
it), Justice Breyer addressed the contents of Step One.
Emphasizing language from Chevron, he described Step One
analysis as "employing traditional tools of statutory
construction."58 For Justice Breyer, such traditional tools include
legislative history. Indeed, in short order thereafter, Justice
Breyer rehearsed Colony 's reading of the legislative history. 59
None of the above opinions have carried the day, nor are they
likely to. Whether legislative history is considered at Step One
largely depends on the accident of which judge- a textualist or a
purposivist-happens to pen the particular decision.so

B. BrandX
In 2005, the Supreme Court took another major step (whether
forward or backward) in deference doctrine in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services. si
The Court held that a subsequent regulation promulgated by an
agency trumps prior judicial interpretation of a statute as long as
two conditions are met: the regulation qualifies for Chevron
deference and the prior cases did not base their results on an
Petitioners at 8 n.2, Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704
(2011) (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 1775871, at *8 n.2; Brief for the United States in Opposition at
11, Mayo, 131 S. Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 1557537, at *11; Brief of Georgetown Univ.,
Loyola Univ. Med. Center, St. Louis Univ., Univ. of Arkansas, Univ. of North Dakota, Univ. of
Rochester, Univ. of Tennessee & Vanderbilt Univ. as Amici Curiae at 15 n.11, Mayo, 131 S. Ct.
704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 545704, at *15 n. 11. Nonetheless, Justice Roberts' opinion for the
Court cited no committee reports. See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711-16.
In a post-Mayo tax decision, the Court did not comment on committee reports
generally, but it did unanimously condemn reliance on so called "Blue Books," i.e., post·
enactment reports on legislation prepared by Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation.
United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 568 (2013).
There is some incongruity between some judges' disregard of committee reports and the
fact that Treasury regulations provide that taxpayer reliance on committee reports including the Blue Books - can preclude imposition of accuracy-related tax penalties. See
Treas. Reg. § l.6662·4(d)(3)(iii).
57. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). See also Irving Salem, Supreme Court Clarifies Mayo; or Is It
Something Bolder? TAX NOTES, Jan. 9, 2012, at 255 (discussing Judulang).
58. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 465 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (2004)).
59. Id. at 1844.
60. See e.g., Loving V. ms, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2013) (the court took a
textual approach to Chevron and gave legislative history short shrift at Step One).
61. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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unambiguous statute.62
It was clear from the start that internal tensions in Brand X
would require that the Court modify this formulation in later cases.
First, when the regulation seeks to oust a pre-Brand X decision, it
often "will be incredibly difficult to determine whether the decision
purported to be giving meaning to an ambiguous, or rather an
unambiguous, statute."63 That is because, in such cases, the Court
''had no inkling that it must utter the magic words 'ambiguous' or
'unambiguous' in order to (poof1) expand or abridge executive power
.... Indeed, [the courts were] unaware of even the utility (much less
the necessity) of making the ambiguous/nonambiguous
determination in [such prior] cases .... "64
Second, Brand X involved a subsequent regulation trumping a
lower court (federal circuit court) decision. Brand X did not state
whether its rule allows agencies to overthrow U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. Taxpayers in some cases of the Home Concrete line
argued that Brand X does not allow this result.6 5
Third, Brand X did not speak to whether the prior court's
opinion could be reexamined by a later court. For example,
suppose the earlier decision said that the statute is unambiguous
but that assertion is plainly incorrect. Would a later court (one
reviewing a regulation purporting to oust the earlier decision) be
bound by the earlier court's erroneous assertion, or could it probe
the validity of the assertion?
Home Concrete did not answer these and other questions about
Brand X because the plurality took the doctrine into new territory.
According to the plurality, Brand X and prior cases (including
Chevron) were based on "deciding whether, or when, a particular
statute in effect delegates to an agency the power to fill a gap,
thereby implicitly taking from a court the power to void a
reasonable gap-filling interpretation."66
The plurality acknowledged "that judges today [might] use
other methods to determine whether Congress left a gap to fill,"
then added: "[b]ut that is beside the point. The question is whether
the Court in Colony concluded that the statute left such a gap.
And, in our view, [Colony] makes it clear that it did not."67
To Justice Scalia, this revised deference doctrine leads "in a
62. Id. at 982. See also Doug Geyser, Note, Courts Still "Say What the Law ls":
Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 2129 (2006).
63. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1846 (emphasis in original).
65. See Mark E. Berg, Practitioner Has Minor Quibble with Analysis of Home Concrete,
TAX NOTES, July 9, 2012, at 213.
66. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1843.
67. Id. at 1844.
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direction that will create confusion and uncertainty'' because it
adds "yet another lopsided story to the ugly and improbable
structure that our law of administrative review has become,"68
thus "making our judicial-review jurisprudence curiouser and
curiouser . . . ."69
To Justice Scalia, the answer to the conundrum is easy. He
dissented in Brand X and remains unreconstructed. Brand X
jurisprudence does not become byzantine if Brand Xis discarded.
Justice Scalia is clearly correct in his diagnosis, if not necessarily
in his prescribed remedy. Brand X needed fixing from the start,
but the approach of the plurality makes the doctrine more, not
less, unwieldy.
The difference between Justice Breyer's and Justice Scalia's
approaches to Brand Xis illustrated by the line of cases testing the
validity of the check-the-box regulations. The Code prescribes
different income tax treatment of corporations as opposed to
partnerships as opposed to trusts as opposed to disregarded
entities such as sole proprietorships and divisions of
corporations.70 Thus, significant consequences turn on how an
entity is classified.
The applicable statutes are of limited help in effecting such
classifications.71 Thus, case law and Treasury regulations have
long done the heavy lifting. In 1935, in the Morrissey case, the
Supreme Court held that an entity organized as a trust under
state law was nonetheless taxable as a corporation for federal
income tax purposes. 72 The Court reached its decision based on
"the salient features" of trusts and corporations, 73 noting certain
characteristics as typical of a corporation, including the existence
of associates, continuity of the entity, centralized management,
limited personal liability, ready transferability of ownership
interests, and title to property. 74 Morrissey gave no indication that
the Court considered classification a matter of option or election
for the entity in question.
Subsequent cases, particularly the Kintner decision, 75
developed this approach. The Treasury Department promulgated
68. Id. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1848.
70. In general, C corporations are separate taxpayers from their shareholders while
partnerships are pass-through entities subject to complex computational rules and
disregarded entities have no independent status. See, e.g., I.R.C. ch. 1, subchs. C & K.
71. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 770l(a)(3) (2010) (providing a sketchy "definition" of corporation).
72. Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
73. Id. at 359.
74. Id. at 359-61.
75. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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regulations based on this case law-the so called Kintner
regulations-which enshrined the mandatory approach, making
classification depend upon the presence or absence of defined
entity characteristics. 7 6
This mandatory approach was in place between at least 1935
(the date of Morrissey) and December 1996. On that latter date,
the Treasury replaced the Kintner regulations with the check-thebox regulations, giving eligible entities substantial freedom to
choose how they will be classified for tax purposes. 77 This change
was based on the perception that the mandatory approach forced
taxpayers and the IRS to expend excessive time and money
applying the designated factors. 7s
Some commentators challenged the validity of the check-thebox regulations. 79 Nonetheless, the regulations have been upheld
by every court that has passed on them, first by the Sixth Circuit
in the Littriello case,so then by a succession of other circuits and
trial courts.s 1
How does the Littriello line of cases fit with Brand X as
interpreted by Home Concrete? This question turns on whether
Morrissey precluded the check-the-box regulations- just as the
question in Home Concrete turned on whether Colony precluded
the new section 6501(e) regulations. As seen below, one likely
would answer this question differently under the plurality's
approach than under Justice Scalia's approach.
The Morrissey Court noted the sparse statutory definition of
"corporation,"s2 and it traced the evolving case law and regulations
attempting to give the definition greater content.SS The court
observed that
without further [statutory] definition, the Treasury Department
was authorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act
within the permissible bounds of administrative construction.
Nor can this authority be deemed to be so restricted that the
regulations, once issued, could not later be clarified or enlarged
so as to meet administrative exigencies or conform to judicial
decision . . .. We find no ground for the contention that by the
76. Treas. Reg.§§ 301.7701-1 to .3 (as effective up to December 1996).
77. Treas. Reg. §§ 301. 7701-1 to .3 (2011).
78. E.g., Pierre v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 24, 30 (2009); Dover Corp. v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 324,
330 (2004).
79. E.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV.
185 (2004).
80. Littriello v. United States, 484 F. 3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007).
81. E.g., McNamee v. Dep't of Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Med. Practice
Solutions, LLC v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. 125 (2009).
82. "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance
companies." Revenue Act of 1924 § 2(a)(2), 43 Stat. 253.
83. Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 349-52 (1935).
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enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924 the Department was
limited to its previous regulations as to associations .... We
think that the Department did not exceed its powers m
rewriting its regulation, in the light of [judicial decisions).84

But Morrissey did not rest on the regulations. "The difficulty
with the regulations as an exposition was that they themselves
required explication; that they left many questions open with
respect both to their application to particular enterprises and to
their validity as applied."S5
Accordingly, Morrissey rested not upon the regulations but
upon the Court's construction of the statute. ss Although
acknowledging that "it is impossible in the nature of things to
translate the statutory concept of 'association' into a particularity
of detail that would fix the status of every sort of enterprise or
organization which ingenuity may create,"s7 the Morrissey
decision-in the construction of ordinary and accepted commercial
meanings--elaborated criteria to resolve the classificatory dispute.
And those criteria ultimately gave rise to the Kintner regulations.
In Home Concrete, the plurality and Justice Scalia took
different approaches to the degree of administrative flexibility that
exists after judicial interpretation of a statute. Those different
approaches likely would mean different views as to whether the
Littriello cases were correctly decided.
For the plurality, the controlling question under Brand X is
whether Congress left a gap for the agency to fill. It found no such
gap as to the section 6501(e) regulations.ss Perhaps Colony could
more or less plausibly be read to find no gap in the statute. The
same could not be said of Morrissey. The above quoted language
makes plain that the Morrissey Court found gaps aplenty in the
statutory definition of "corporation." Thus, the approach of the
Home Concrete plurality, if applied to the Littriello context, would
uphold the validity of the check-the-box regulations under Brand X.
In contrast, Justice Scalia's Home Concrete concurrence
repeated his position-rejected by the majority in Brand X-that:
"Once a court has decided upon its de nova construction of the
statute, there no longer is a different construction that is
consistent with the court's holding and available for adoption by
84. Id. at 354-55.
85. Id. at 356.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012) ("The
question is whether the Court in Colony concluded that the statute left such a gap. And, in
our view, the opinion ... makes clear that it did not .... [T]here being no gap to fill, the
Government's gap-filling regulation cannot change Colony's interpretation of the statute.").
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the agency."89 Accordingly, Justice Scalia concurred in Home
Concrete ''because it is indisputable that Colony resolved the
construction of the statutory language at issue h ere, and that
construction must therefore control."90 Morrissey construed the
1924 Revenue Act, adducing operative criteria from which
classification was mandatory.91 Nothing whatever in Morrissey
suggested that classification is elective.92 Application of Justice
Scalia's approach would call into question the validity of the checkthe-box regulations.
We have not seen the end debate about the effect of Home
Concrete on Brand X.93 The doctrinal "clarifications" in Home
Concrete will require their own clarifications in future cases, tax
and non-tax.
VI.

STATUTORY I NTERPRETATION

A. Elephants and Mouseholes

This title derives from a principle of statutory interpretation
that appears in Home Concrete. Under this principle, a court will
require clear legislative evidence before it holds that a statute was
intended to effect a major substantive change. Inferences from
wisps of textual or ot her evidence will not suffice. "Congress ...
does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in
vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say,
hide elephants in mouseholes."94 This principle, a relative of the
"plain statement" canon of construction, has been invoked in many

89. Id. at 1846 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat') Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1018 n.13 (2005)).
90. Id. at 1848.
91. The Morrissey Court classified the entity at issue by analysis of the entity's "salient
features." 296 U.S. at 359. The language of the applicable statute-an ancestor of current
l.R.C. § 7701(a)(3)- was sparse, but the Court developed its analysis from the connotations
and implications of the statutory terms. See id. at 295·97.
92. The Court acknowledged that Treasury had room to interpret the statute and to
later to revise its interpretation. But the Court did not accord Treasury unlimited flexibility.
To be valid, t he interpretation or reinterpretation had to conform to the statute and judicial
decisions; they could not supplant them with a wholly novel approach of Treasury's role
devising. Id. at 354-55 ("[T)he Treasury Department was authorized to supply rules for the
enforcement of the act within the permissible bounds of a dministrative construction. Nor
can this authority be deemed t o be so restrictive that the regulations, once issued, could not
later be clarified or enlarged so as to meet administrative contingencies or conform to
judicia l decision.") (emphasis added).
93. A recent Fourth Circuit case is an example. The court held that a Board of
Immigration Appeals interpretation trumped a prior Fourth Circuit construction of a
statute. The court acknowledged both the plurality's and Justice Scalia's Home Concrete
views but distinguished Home Concrete. Patel v. Napolitano, 706 F.3d 370, 375-376 (4th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, Patel v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 1282 (2014).
94. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
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federal and state cases, both tax95 and non-tax.96
In Home Concrete, the government argued that changes to
what is now section 6015(e) which were made after the years at
issue in Colony, required a different outcome.97 The Home Concrete
majority rejected this contention, finding the changes too weak to
support the government's argument. Justice Breyer added to the
metaphorical luxuriance of the precept: "to rely ... on this solitary
word change in a different subsection is like hoping that a new
batboy will change the outcome of the World Series."98

B. Stare Decisis
The majority/plurality opinion is inconsistent in its adherence
to stare decisis. On the one hand, its reaffirmation of Colony was
based on a strong invocation of the principle. 99
On the other hand, Colony states: "it cannot be said that the
language [of even the old version of the statute] is
unambiguous."100 The plurality brushed this aside on the ground
that "the Court decided [Colony] nearly 30 years before it decided
Chevron. There is no reason to believe that the linguistic
ambiguity noted by Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion that
Congress had delegated gap-filling power to the [Treasury]."10 1
In other words, the plurality discounted what Colony did say in
favor of what it thought Colony would have said had the Colony
Court anticipated Chevron nearly 30 years later, Brand X nearly
50 years later, and Home Concrete's refinement of Colony nearly
55 years later. This is not adherence to stare decisis; it is
imaginative reconstruction in the extreme.

C. Continuing Dialogue
Home Concrete contains interesting byplay between Justice
Scalia's concurrence and Justice Kennedy's dissent as to a core
question of statutory interpretation in tax: the respective roles of
the branches of government.
The dissent advanced the proposition: "Our legal system
95. See Steve R. Johnson, Elephants, Mouse Holes, Non-Barking Dogs, and Statutory
Interpretation, STATE TAX NOTES, June 25, 2012, at 911.
96. E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000); MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
97. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1841.
98. Id. at 1842. See also id. at 1849 (Scalia, J. concurring) (stating that a precedent should
not ''be overturned on the basis of statutory indications as feeble as those asserted here').
99. Id. at 1841 (majority opinion).
100. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
101. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844.
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presumes there will be continuing dialogue among the three
branches of Government on questions of statutory interpretation
and application." 102 This is a notion Justice Kennedy has urged
before.1oa Some commentators have espoused similar views. 104
Justice Scalia, of course, has repeatedly inveighed against
doctrines that liberate judges to substitute their preferences for
those of Congress. Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia rejected Justice
Kennedy's "romantic, judge-empowering image," seeing it as
inconsistent with Vermont Yankee's teaching "that Congress
prescribes and we obey, with no discretion to add to the
administrative procedures that Congress has created."105
D. ''Best Answer" Versus Deference
At the heart of the peculiarities of Home Concrete is its
unsatisfactory attempt to cobble together two fundamentally
inconsistent approaches to statutory interpretation: the ''best
answer" model versus the deferential model. A ''best answer" court
looks at all available evidence in the attempt to discover the single,
true, or best meaning of the statute.1os
The deferential model, in contrast, is built on the premise that
there may be several permissible interpretations of a statute. The
role of the courts is not to enshrine the only or the best answer but
merely to make sure that the interpretative answer the agency
selects is within the range of the permissible.
Colony was a ''best answer" exercise at a time when this model
dominated. All three of the Home Concrete opinions acknowledged that
we now are in a world in which, within limits, deference holds sway. 107
On the basis of an inconsistently applied notion of stare decisis,
Home Concrete engrafted a ''best answer" decision onto a deferential
jurisprudence. As Mead muddled Chevron, so Home Concrete
muddles Brand x. 1os Contemporary deference doctrine, and the
102. Id. at 1852 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. E.g., William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 541, 543 (1988).
105. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1848. See also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
106. E.g., Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) ("Our duty then is to find that
interpretation which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of
being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress
manifested.") (punctuation omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)); Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293
U.S. 121, 126 (1934) (looking to related sections and t he history of tax legislation in trying
to ascertain "the true meaning [of a section] of the revenue acts").
107. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion); id. at 1846 (Scalia, J ..
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1851-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. Lisa Shultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial. Review of Agency Action.,
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statutory interpretation landscape of which it is a feature, is a house
of cards. Home Concrete jerry-rigs another fix onto the system. The
most fundamental question raised by Home Concrete is how long
that system can endure before it collapses of its own weight.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Administrative law principles have irreversibly established
themselves as part of tax law . 109 The consequences of this "intrusion"
will take decades to fully work out. Thus, the ongoing wave of
litigation as to the validity of tax regulations is unlikely soon to abate.
Tax has always been about statutory interpretation. Perhaps no
other body of substantive law engages principles of interpretation
more often than does tax law. We are in an era of intense interest
in, and controversy about, statutory interpretation. 110
Home Concrete reflects the intersection of these administrative
and statutory currents. What the Court did in Home Concrete is
unlikely to put any issue to rest. Yet its insights as to those issues
cannot be ignored and will be analyzed and debated for years in
the case law and the commentary. And what the Court refrained
from doing in Home Concrete will allow the pressure to continue to
build on the issues, demanding eventual resolution. Home Concrete
is a marker on a long and important road.

58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444·45 (2005); see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
109. See Steve R. Johnson, Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative Law
in Tax Law, TA.X NOTES, Aug. 23, 2010, at 837, 838 (2010).
110. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. R EV. 241 (1992).

